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Collective decisions are often made under the condition of incomplete
and asymmetric information among group members. For example, a
committee may be chaired by a person that has privileged access to
information or a committee may consist of individuals who trust some
but not all of the other committee members and hence share infor-
mation only with a subset of the members. In fact, any organization
that relies on committees to decide on a policy is to some extent con-
fronted with an asymmetric distribution of information across agents
with heterogeneous individual preferences.
Such settings can be considered abstract versions of decision pro-
cesses repeatedly observed in policy networks such as the European
Union. The European Commission, for example, develops directives
in close cooperation with member states and various lobby organiza-
tions that often do not - or only very restrictively - share information
among each other (Thomson et al. 2006; Thurner and Binder 2008).
Another relevant setting is a situation in which non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) are involved in a policy process. These might on the
one hand, as above, be considered as one `composite' agent by the other
agents involved in the decision making process. The NGOs might, on
the other hand, actually base their decisions about their joint posi-
tions within a larger actor constellation on information shared with
a subset of friendly NGOs but not with others. A growing body of
empirical studies of NGO inﬂuence on EU policy-making is suggestive
of the diﬃculties involved in coordination in such situations (Biliouri
1999; Beyres 2004; Greenwood 2003; Hallstrom 2004; Mahoney 2004).
Similar real-world situations can also be observed in more mundane
settings such as committee decisions in local municipalities, associa-
tions, or universities.
In this study, we abstract from the particularities of such situations
and aim to single out some of the mechanisms of decision making in
a committee. The focus of our analysis lies on the eﬀects of commu-
nication structures within a group on the outcome of the collective
decision. Possible information asymmetries may generate uncertainty
about other group members' behavior and thereby induce power asym-
metries within a group.
Our main research question is which impact diﬀerent network con-
stellations - implying diﬀerent distributions of information - have on
the probability of articulation majority decision and on the content
of the decision. We explore the eﬀect of incomplete and asymmetric
information on majority formation by deﬁning two diﬀerent networks
structures, a circle and a star (see, e.g., Bala and Goyal 2000) and
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compare these to an unconnected network without communication as
a reference treatment.
In recent years, there has been an upswing in network research
(for excellent surveys see Dutta and Jackson 2003, Jackson and Watts
1998, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Kosfeld 2004, Goyal 2007). The
literature can be roughly divided in two strands: the ﬁrst examining
the formation of networks, the second dealing with the impact on out-
comes. Our research question is related to this second strand where
network structures are exogenously speciﬁed and the impact on theo-
retical predictions and empirical results is observed (see, e.g. Bala and
Goyal 2000, Glaeser et al. 1996, Morris 2000, Charness et al. 2007,
Chwe 2000). We do not endogenize network formation or the shape of
emerging networks.
In order to control for distributional concerns within the group,
we restrict our analysis to collective problem solving (in contrast to
spot contracts, distributive bargaining, and positive coordination; see
Scharpf 1997). We frame the situation as a dictator game. The prob-
lem to be solved in this game is to agree on an amount to be trans-
ferred from all committee members to a receiver group of equal size.
The responsibility for a dependent party without entitlement appears
to reﬂect the reality of political decision making in the context of prob-
lem solving better than the allocation or reallocation of endowments
within a group of decision makers. Since the decision does not aﬀect
within-group redistribution but spreads the costs equally among the
committee members we can disregard behavior related to such redis-
tributional conﬂict (see, e.g., Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2007, Tyran
and Sausgruber 2006, Traub et al. 2009).
The standard game theoretic prediction, assuming fully informed
rational agents maximizing their own proﬁts, is the smallest possible
transfer. Therefore the network structure should not have any eﬀect
on the outcome and the size of the transfer chosen should be zero in
all instances. When relaxing these theoretical assumptions, a coordi-
nation problem arises where the communication structure might play
a decisive role.
Thus the focus is on the extent to which individual revenue max-
imization and social preferences, captured by the size of the transfer,
are represented in the group decision. Real-world counterparts would
be situations in which money is spent collectively without clear positive
eﬀects (apart from intrinsic motivations) on the committee members
themselves, while others will proﬁt from the transfer.
The paper is structured as follows: In the second section, the ex-
perimental design is outlined. The third section explains the analytical
framework, the theoretical argument and the hypotheses. Section four
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presents details of the experimental setup. In section ﬁve, we report
our ﬁndings and section six concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We study the impact of communication networks on group decisions
in a highly controlled laboratory environment. We form groups of ﬁve
anonymous subjects with the task to allocate a pie between them-
selves and a second group of ﬁve anonymous subjects that is actually
present in the lab, but as anonymous as the members of the dictator
group. The recipients group has no other option than to take whatever
the dictator allocates to them, with every transfer being distributed
equally amongst the group members. If a majority (at least three out
of ﬁve group members) chooses a certain allocation, it is implemented,
whereas in case of no majority choice the dictator group earns nothing
and the payoﬀ for each member of the recipient group is a random draw
from a uniform distribution covering the range of possible transfers.
Our examination of the communication structure diﬀers signiﬁ-
cantly from previous studies on the eﬀects of communication. In the
realm of simple bargaining games the research on communication ef-
fects largely concentrated on the communication media (Roth 1995;
Sia, Tan and Wei 2002; Brosig et al. 2003; Luhan et al. 2009). A con-
siderable, yet growing, body of experimental literature has examined
the equilibrium choice in coordination games with a particular focus
on the impact of communication and learning in repeated interaction
(see Ochs 1995, for an overview).
We implemented the decision task as a dictator game rather than a
standard coordination game. In this game we expect social preferences
to generate intragroup conﬂicts, while featuring obvious focal points
for coordinating collective action as is described in the next section.
In order to test the inﬂuence of communication networks on the
group decision making process, we ﬁrst designed a baseline treatment
with an unconnected group (nocom). In this treatment the members of
the dictator group individually set their transfers without any means
of coordination. If no majority choice is reached in the ﬁrst attempt,
the group members may choose transfers for a second time without
any information on the previous choices of the other group members.
But the setting of an unconnected network as a decision making
group is most unrealistic and serves only as a reference point. Com-
munication channels of various forms can be found in any political
context, either structured or unstructured. As we try to examine the
basic eﬀects of communication networks we want to exclude any eﬀects
of the actual communication channels used and restrict communication
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Figure 1: Star-shaped network Figure 2: Circular network
to a very limited and strictly structured form.
We implemented this idea as a two stage game, where in the ﬁrst
stage the members of the dictator group individually propose a share
of their endowment to be transferred to the other group. This infor-
mation is then revealed selectively to other group members according
to the network structure and thus serves as an indicator of the transfer
that the respective subject is willing to choose. In the second stage,
individuals simultaneously make a decision on the share to be trans-
ferred. Only if a majority of the group enters the same amount in
this stage, the transfer is eﬀectuated for all members of the group.
Thus, the individual share proposed by a majority becomes the group
share. As in the nocom treatment the group had a second chance to
form a majority, should they have failed to do so in the ﬁrst attempt.
They would go through both stages again, submitting a proposal in
the ﬁrst stage, which would be revealed, and subsequently choosing
the transfer.
We model two network structures, a star-shaped network with one
central group member (star) - as depicted in Figure 1 - and a circular
network (circle) - as depicted in Figure 2. The network structures are
common knowledge to the group members.
In the star-shaped network, only the central member (member 1)
can see all proposals and only her proposal is visible to all other group
members. In the circular network, all agent are informed about the
proposals of their immediate neighbors to the right and to the left. We
discuss the hypothesized implications of these two network structures
in the next section.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
The dictator game was ﬁrst introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986)
in an empirical study on fairness in the market place. We know from
an extensive experimental literature that, typically, individuals show
social preferences to a certain, though individually varying, extent
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(see, e.g., Blount 1995; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels
2000). Camerer (2003) reports average transfers in the range from
10 to 23% in several individual dictator games. In the context of the
extensive literature on individual behavior we thus ask whether equity-
and reciprocity-oriented individuals change their behavior in a dictator
game when they are part of a group.
The common notion of a fair split might serve as a clue in the
process of majority formation. This notion was repeatedly observed
in experimental studies, for example on the ultimatum game, where
general transfers exceed 30% of the pie (e.g. Camerer and Thaler 1995)
with the equal split being the modal oﬀer. Recipients repeatedly reject
transfers of less than 20% in such situations (Roth 1995; Pillutla and
Murnighan 1995).
As mentioned above, the actual task is only a framework for the
group decision-making process and its ﬁnal outcomes, which is the
focus of our study. In the decision-making group every member (n =
5) has to decide individually on a transfer x of her share of the
stake, c = C/n, with x ≤ c. If a majority of at least three group
members individually choose the same transfer x, this is set to be every
group member's transfer and X = nx is transferred to the recipients
group. Irrespective of the individual choices, x is deducted from each
member's initial endowment, thereby creating payoﬀs of
yd = c− x (1)
for the members of the dictator group and
yr = x (2)
for each member of the recipient group.
If no majority emerges, the members of the dictator group receive
no payoﬀ while the recipients' payoﬀ is drawn from a random distri-
bution between zero and ﬁve.1
For all treatments, including the nocom treatment, the predictions
of standard game theory are straightforward: Purely selﬁsh, proﬁt
maximizing agents will individually set the lowest possible transfer of
zero and this is the unanimous group decision. Theory assumes ra-
tional agents, aware of the rationality of all other players. Therefore,
each subject can individually presume to be part of a group featuring
homogeneous preferences that acts unanimously. We therefore set our
ﬁrst hypothesis accordingly
Hypothesis 1: All groups will unanimously decide on transfers of
1Note, that this is not a pure coordination game (see, e.g., Van Huyck et al. 1990,
1991) as the players have individual (unobserved) preferences over the transfer.
6
X = 0.
As noted above, this is challenged by models incorporating social pref-
erences which are conﬁrmed by experimental evidence on individual
(see Camerer 2003, for an overview), as well as on group dictator games
(e.g., Cason and Mui 1994; Luhan et al. 2009). In the framework of
group decision-making without any coordination, the assumption of
heterogeneous social preferences leads to multiple equilibria. Without
any priors on the distribution of social preferences within the group
(hence a uniform distribution), the group members will simply set their
preferred transfer. Therefore, any transfer out of the action space con-
stitutes an equiprobable majority choice. With the given probability
of 7.25× 10−6, however, the occurrence of a majority choice is rather
unlikely under this assumption.2
According to the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
there are two possible equilibria, a very fair one at x = 50% and
a very unfair one at x = 0% in the individual dictator game. In
our context, these equilibria serve as focal points for possible transfer
choices.3
Depending on an agent's beliefs about the distribution of fair
and selﬁsh types amongst the group members and her social pref-
erences she will choose either one of these transfers. The reasoning
is straightforward: We claim that irrespective of the individual social
preferences, each member of the dictator group will choose the transfer
she believes to be most likely to be chosen by at least two other group
members, as any transfer other than the majority-compatible one will
presumably result in a payoﬀ of zero. Even without prior information
about the other group members, each of these transfers will lead to a
majority choice with a probability of 50%. A selﬁsh agent in a mostly
fair group will therefore choose a transfer of 50% as other transfers
are irrelevant or will even reduce the probability of a positive payoﬀ. A
fair agent in a mostly selﬁsh group will on the other hand only choose a
transfer of 50% if she is willing to sacriﬁce her payoﬀ of 100% to gener-
27.25 × 10−6 is the probability to observe three identical numbers when drawing ﬁve
times from an urn containing 51 numbers and placing the drawn numbers back before each
subsequent draw.
3Fehr and Schmidt (1999) discuss the possibility of a continuum of fairness equilibria
in the dictator game, when abandoning the assumption of piecewise linear inequity aver-
sion. Utility functions that are concave with respect to advantageous inequality result in
optimal oﬀers within the range of [0, 0.5]. In individual decisions subjects with a β > 0.5
will transfer 0.5, an individual β < 0.5 will lead subjects to transfer 0. With imperfect
information regarding the other group members' preferences it is obvious that the corner
solutions - equal to the piecewise linear equilibria of 0 and 0.5, respectively - will serve as
focal points when trying to coordinate on a common transfer.
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ate an expected payoﬀ of (the smallest increment more than) 25%4 for
the members of the receiver group, which is an unrealistic assumption
when assuming the standard parametrization of 0 < α ≤ β ≤ 1 (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999).
When considering social norms, the equal split remains as the only
focal point of coordination. The `Social Comparison Theory' (Fes-
tinger, 1954) states that subjects try to present themselves in a way
that is socially desirable. Cason and Mui (1994) discussed the impli-
cations of this theory in the context of the group dictator game. In
absence of any information on the distribution of social preferences the
probability of 50% transfers exceeds the probability of 0%, conﬁrming
50% as the focal point of coordination. Again, this focal point is found
as the modal choice in ultimatum games, where selﬁsh agents strategi-
cally choose fair transfers in order to maximize their expected payoﬀs.
Even selﬁsh agents, unaware of the distribution of social preferences
within their group, will choose this transfer as it maximizes the prob-
ability of a majoritarian choice.
Hypothesis 2: In absence of prior information about the distribution
of social preferences within the dictator group, the equal split of 50%
will maximize the probability of a majority choice.
In the star-shaped network, we contend that a focal point is eﬀective.
Schelling (1960) describes the impact of any commonly observed infor-
mation and claims that this information can make any equilibrium a
focal point. In our setting, the commonly observed information is not
exogenously given, but a part of the actual decision process. In this re-
spect our paper is connected to Eckel and Wilson (2007) who study the
impact of high status central players in coordination games. Thus in
the star treatment, the only equilibrium choice is the proposal of the
central member. Not only does her choice constitute 33% of a possible
majority but also this proposal is the only possible point of coordina-
tion since it is commonly observed.
Hypothesis 3: In the star-shaped network, the central member's
choice is the equilibrium/majority choice.
The central agent, in turn, is not bound to the above-described focal
points. Aware of her special position, the central agent can choose her
proposal and subsequent transfer according to her individual (social)
preferences. Though she observes all proposals from her group, she is
bound to stick to her initial proposal because otherwise the coordina-
4The payoﬀ for the receivers was deﬁned randomly as any amount between 0 and 5 in
steps of 0.1. The expected payoﬀ from a random distribution [0,5] in steps of 0.1 equals
2.55.
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tion eﬀect of the commonly observed proposal would be destroyed.
Hypothesis 4: Central members will not be inﬂuenced by the other
group members' proposals.
We cannot form an a priori hypothesis on whether the star shaped
networks will increase or decrease the group transfers as this is subject
to the social preferences of the central group members. But we do
expect this network structure to signiﬁcantly increase the number of
majority choices in the course of the experiment.
Hypothesis 5: Star-shaped-network groups will reach majority choice
more frequently than unconnected groups.
The second network structure we examine is a circular network as de-
picted in Figure 2. Here the proposals as well as the actual transfers
are only observed by the immediate neighbors in the network. Each
agent is informed about the proposals and transfers of the agents lo-
cated to her left and right. This, on the one hand, provides every
agent with information about a subgroup large enough to potentially
implement a majority choice on their own.
But, on the other hand, both neighbors observe the actions of only
one agent out of this subgroup. Therefore even if an agent observes
three identical proposals she cannot take this as a secure sign for a
majority choice as her neighbors might observe very diﬀerent propos-
als and therefore choose an actual transfer diﬀering from the initial
proposal. Coordination or compromising on this information subset of
three proposals might therefore not be a successful strategy. The ex-
treme case would be that the group members do not take the proposals
as valid information and retreat to the focal point of the unconnected
groups.
This recourse on the clear focal points would be in line with Elison
(1993), and Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996) who show that local
interaction generates risk dominant equilibria. An experimental test
is reported in Keser et al. (1998) who embed a three player coordi-
nation game in a network structure of eight connected subjects. This
circular structure leads subjects to resorted signiﬁcantly more often
(74%) to the risk dominant strategy than the subjects in the control
group (15%) despite the entailed lower payoﬀs. We therefore form two
antithetic hypotheses (6 and 7) for the circular network.
Hypothesis 6: In the circular network, the observed proposals will
have a signiﬁcant impact on the individual transfer choice.
If we apply the same reasoning as in the case of unconnected groups
that agents may choose any transfer size with equal probability, the
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chance that a situation occurs in which both received proposals are
identical with the one sent is very small. Hence information obtained
in a circle is of little value because no agent can trust that others
will stick to their proposal. Consequently in the absence of reliable
information, the outcome should approach the uninformed and uncon-
nected baseline situation.
Hypothesis 7: In the circular network, the equal split is the equilib-
rium/majority choice. The observed proposals will have no impact on
the individual transfer choice.
4 Experimental Procedure
We implemented the above described decision task computerized us-
ing z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) in the Laboratory for Experimental So-
cial and Political Science, University of Oldenburg. Participants were
recruited in groups of twenty from a pool consisting of students of
all faculties of the University. Four sessions were run for the nocom
treatment and six sessions for each the star and the circle treatment,
creating eight group observations for the nocom treatment, twelve for
the star treatment and eleven for the circle treatment (one session
consisted of only ten participants due to low show up).
Upon arrival, the subjects were seated randomly at computer car-
rels that prevented communicating or seeing the screens of the other
players. Instructions were distributed in paper form and a recording
of the instructions was played to assure standardized conditions and
common information. Subjects were informed about the details of the
respective treatment and the communication structure (or the absence
of communication).
The experimental currency was `points' and the oﬃcial rate of ex-
change was two Euros per point. So in the lab setup the endowment
of the group C was 25 points and an equal split transfer was x = 2.5.
We used a one-shot, between-subjects setup with a single decision
task with two trials for the formation of a majority. Hence each sub-
ject played the game only once.5 An experiment lasted ten minutes
on average. After the experiment the subjects ﬁlled in a short ques-
5We decided to use a one-shot setup as we are more interested in the pure eﬀect of
communication structures than in observing any kind of evolution toward an equilibrium
under one of the network structures. With repeated interaction we could observe whether
learning patterns are diﬀerent in diﬀerent communication networks, which is an interesting
question but not the focus of this article.We believe that a one-shot interaction is appro-
priate for answering our research questions while avoiding the usual problems of repeated
interaction, e.g., super game eﬀects.
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tionnaire, were paid privately in cash and were released. Subjects that
were allocated to the recipient group were asked to ﬁll a questionnaire
during the experiment.
5 Results
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics from all three treatments.
Columns one and two contain the treatments and the number of indi-
vidual decisions. The third column indicates the number of groups and
the fourth presents the number of groups that succeeded in reaching a
majority decision in the ﬁrst or second attempt. Columns ﬁve and six
contain means and standard deviations of actual group transfers for
those groups that attained a majority, columns 7 and 8 contain means
and standard deviations for ﬁrst proposals, that is, the proposals en-
tered in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
As expected, the decision task was hardest in the nocom treat-
ment. Out of the eight groups in the nocom treatment, only three
reached a majority choice, one of those only in the second run. These
results reinforce our Hypothesis 5: Only 37.5% of the nocom groups
made a majority choice, whereas 83.3% of the groups accomplished
this in the ﬁrst attempt of the star treatment and still 72.7% in the
ﬁrst attempt of the circle treatment. Our data does not support Hy-
pothesis 1 while it is congruent with Hypothesis 2 as all three observed
group transfers in the nocom treatment were 2.5 points (or 5 Euros).
Table 1: Group transfers and ﬁrst proposals
Treatment N Groups Majority Group transfer First proposals
Mean SD Mean SD
nocom 40 8 3 2.5 0.00 - -
star 60 12 12 1.17 1.08 1.07 0.97
circle 55 11 11 1.73 0.79 1.47 0.99
Turning to the realized group transfers, we ﬁnd that they are signif-
icantly higher in the nocom treatment than those in the star (Mann-
Whitney-Test p = 0.043) and in the circle treatments (p = 0.049).
However, although the average size of the group transfers is smaller
in the star treatment than in the circle treatment, this diﬀerence in
group transfers between the two network structures is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
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Finally, we compare the initial proposals in the two network struc-
tures. With regard to the central subjects in the star networks (mem-
ber 1) we ﬁnd that their average proposal (1.26) did not diﬀer signif-
icantly (p = 0.635) from the proposals of the other group members
(1.03). Assuming that the central members were aware of their privi-
leged position, this conﬁrms, on the one hand, that these subjects are
not diﬀerent from the rest of the population. On the other hand, we
ﬁnd that the central network position did not cause behavioral diﬀer-
ences in the ﬁrst place. So we can contend that all the proposals from
central group members appear to reﬂect the true preferences of these
agents. The eﬀect of these `central' proposals is quite striking: Of all
48 remaining subjects, only three proposed the same transfer as the
central subject of their respective group, 50% proposed a higher and
43.7% a lower transfer than the central agent. In the following deci-
sion stage, however, 81.3%6 of all members entered a transfer equal to
the proposal of the central member, which is a clear conﬁrmation of
Hypothesis 3.
Though the centralized proposal is working as well as theoretically
predicted, 50% of the central subjects did not re-enter the transfer they
proposed in the decision stage, leading to a rejection of Hypothesis 4.7
Apparently, one half of the central subjects did not realize that their
proposal worked as a coordination device. They changed their proposal
in the direction of the remaining groups mean proposal, obviously in
a mislead attempt to foster coordination.
In the circle treatment we found the proposals entered to be signiﬁ-
cantly higher (1.47) than those in the star treatment (1.073; p = 0.06).
In the star treatment, the modal proposal of 2.5 was sent by twelve
of the 60 subjects, whereas 60% of the agents chose a proposal of 1.0
or lower. In the circle treatment, 25% of the subjects sent the modal
proposal of 2.5 points and still 20% proposed a transfer of 2 points.
This observed trend towards the equal split in the circular network is
in line with Hypothesis 7, though not conﬁrming it.
As stated above, the available information in this network structure
is not suﬃcient to act as a coordination device. The large fraction of
2.5 oﬀers leads us to conclude that subjects realized the ineﬃciency
of information and resort to the focal point of a 50% oﬀer that would
maximize the probability of coordination.
The left panel of Table 2 contains the estimation results for the
transfers chosen in the circle treatment conditional on the subjects'
6This number increases to 87.5% if we examine only those ten groups of the star
treatment which reached a majority in the ﬁrst attempt.
7These inconsistent actions of the central member actually were the reason for both
observed failures to form majorities in the ﬁrst attempt of the star treatment.
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own proposal as well as on the respective neighbors' proposals.8 We
start with the basic linear model reported in the ﬁrst column of Ta-
ble 2. We test for heteroskedasticity and omitted variables but can
reject both. Using the Ramsey RESET-test for misspeciﬁcation we
rejected the possibility of non-linear combinations of the independent
variables.9
Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd the own proposal (proposal) to have the
largest impact on the transfer choice. However, the coeﬃcients of the
neighbors' proposals (proposal 1 neighbor) are highly signiﬁcant and
their joint inﬂuence on the transfer is even stronger than the own pro-
posal. The large coeﬃcient of the own proposal could be interpreted as
partial adherence to the personal preference despite possibly contrary
proposals from the neighbors. But this coeﬃcient could also be inter-
preted as the attempt to equal out the observed diversity of proposals.
The high rate of successful majority formations at the ﬁrst attempt
(six out of seven groups) fosters the latter interpretation. This leads
us to reject our Hypothesis 7 and to aﬃrm Hypothesis 6.
Examining other potential factors we do not ﬁnd a gender eﬀect
but a moderate inﬂuence of the subjects' age.
In a similar vein, we model the individual transfers in the star
treatment as a function of the own proposal, the proposal of the cen-
tral member as well as age and gender of the subject (right panel of
Table 2). As expected, the proposal of the central member (proposal
member 1) is decisive for the transfers of all group members, thereby
providing further evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3. We ﬁnd that the
best speciﬁcation is again a linear regression with only the own pro-
posal and the proposal of the central agent as explanatory variables
(column 6 of Table 2). Still, the inﬂuence of the own proposal is only
a minor one and might as well be neglected, as displayed by the BIC-
statistics.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the impact of diﬀerent communication net-
work structures on group decision making. The decision task was
8We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of ﬁrst or second trials to form a majority. This
might be due to the low numbers of observations for second trial majorities.We therefore
excluded the trial variable from the estimation reported in Table 2.
9We tested logarithmic transformation of both dependent and independent vari-
ables,which did not improve the quality of the estimation.
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Table 2: Estimation results for both network types
Dependent Variable: transfer
Network Circle Star
proposal 0.452∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.200∗∗
(7.33) (7.51) (2.52) (2.57) (2.55) (2.58)
gender 0.044 -0.033 0.005
(0.36) (0.18) (0.03)
age 0.012 0.013 -0.011 -0.01
(1.30) (1.36) (1.28) (1.27)
proposal 1 0.393∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
neighbor1 (6.56) (6.62)
proposal 1 0.353∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
neighbor2 (5.88) (6.15)
proposal 0.765∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗
member 1 (9.29) (9.95) (10.33) (10.86) (10.17)
constant -0.657∗∗ -0.644∗∗ 0.166 0.127 -0.126 -0.122 0.1
(2.36) (2.36) (0.67) (0.77) (0.79) (1.26) (1.63)
observations 55 55 48 48 48 48 48
AIC 1.17 1.14 1.78 1.74 1.76 1.71 1.78
BIC -144.03 -147.89 -90.89 -94.72 -94.11 -97.98 -96.44
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.79 0.69 0.7 0.69 0.7 0.67
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%
modeled as a group dictator game as in our view this reﬂects the in-
tra group conﬂicts that a heterogeneous committee might face as well
as the motivational structure of preferences and responsibilities for
a third party that is at the core of political decision making in the
problem-solving mode.
We compared unconnected groups that had no possibility to com-
municate for coordination with a star-shaped network with one central,
commonly observed member and a circular network where communi-
cation was possible only with the immediate neighbors.
As expected, both network types increased the rate of successful
decision making signiﬁcantly. Both network structures produced a
100% success rate of majoritarian decisions. In the star treatment,
the group decisions are solely driven by the central agent. Whatever
proposal this agent makes is subsequently adopted as a group decision.
Groups even formed a majority in those occasions where the central
agent changed the proposed transfer amount between the proposal
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phase and the decision phase.10 We thus ﬁnd strong evidence for the
power attributed to the central agent if information about the intention
of other members is provided selectively. Furthermore, although the
whole range of possible transfers has been chosen, on average these
central agents select rather low transfer shares.
The information provided for coordination in the circular network
is less eﬃcient and correctly evaluated as such by the subjects. The
proposals made get closer to the equal split, which is also selected by
successful groups without any information. This trend towards the
socially accepted transfer of 50% of the pie - and therefore towards the
risk dominant strategy - appears to be the reason for the high rate of
successful coordination attempts and majority decisions in the circular
treatment. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Keser et al. (1998) and
Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010). When actually in possession of
the information, however, subjects do use this information to attempt
to coordinate within this subgroup.
Our results show a clear impact of the structure of communication
networks on the ﬁnal outcome of group decision making. Our scope
is of course a very narrow one, comparing only three types of net-
works. Further research could examine other network features such
as the size of the decision making group, or changing network struc-
tures. Moreover, diﬀerent learning patterns in the diﬀerent network
structures might either result in convergence or further diﬀerentiation
of outcomes. Another promising avenue for research is to explore the
extent to which variation in the communication content, such as the
possibility to provide arguments in favor of a proposal, aﬀects the out-
come.
10This result is puzzling because changing the proposed transfer is not a rational strategy
for the central player. The only ad hoc explanation we have, in view of a large number
of freshmen in the pool not previously exposed to the kind of reasoning necessary for the
task, is that half of the central players did not suﬃciently understand their power and
responsibility. But this puzzle remains for further exploration.
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions `star'
treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants until the end of the
experiment!
Instructions
The aim of this experiment is the investigation of decision behaviour.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked
to make decisions. You will earn money in doing so. The amount of
your payoﬀ is determined by your own decisions and by those made
by other participants.
2 types of participants
There are two types of participant: type A and type B. You will be
randomly assigned to one of these types/roles. Your type/role will be
displayed at the upper border of the screen during the experiment.
Duration
The entire experiment will last for approx. 45 minutes. If you have
any questions after reading the instructions, please raise your hand.
One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions
privately.
Payoﬀs
Your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of other
participants in this experiment (see below). You will be paid to you
privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
Anonymity
The identities of the participants that have interacted with you will
never be revealed to you. The other participants will not learn either
during or after the experiment which role you were playing and how
much you have earned.
Grouping
You will be teamed up with four other participants of the same type.
Your position within the group (member 1-5) will be randomly deter-
mined and displayed on the screen. Each group of type A is randomly
matched with one group of type B.
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Initial endowment
Each member of group A receives 5 points as initial endowment.
One point is worth 2 EURO, so your initial endowment corresponds to
10 EURO.
The members of group B do not receive an initial endowment.
Decision group A: Choice of a transfer
Each Participant of group A individually speciﬁes a transfer that de-
termines which part of his/her initial endowment will be transferred
to group B. Each amount between 0 and 5 points (in steps of 0.1) can
be selected. It is possible to transfer nothing or the whole 5 points.
If the members group A choose x points, this means that this amount
x will be transferred from each member of group A to one member of
group B.
Prior to the transfer choice the members of group A have to post a
proposal for this transfer. These individual proposals will be displayed
to speciﬁc members of the team as displayed in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1:
Player 1 will be displayed all proposals from his teammates. All other
team members will see only the proposal from member 1.
After all proposals were displayed the members select the transfer in-
dividually.
This concludes stage 1 for participant A.
Majority: If more than half of all group members (3) have selected the
same transfer this constitutes a majority decision.
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If no majority decision is found group A may attempt to do so in phase
2. The group members can again make individual proposals and select
a transfer in this second phase.
Group B cannot take any action. The members of group B
will be asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire individually.
Results/earnings
Alternative 1.: A majority decision was found. The transfer chosen
by the majority of group A is transferred to group B.
Earnings of each member of group A = 5 points - Transfer
Earnings of each member of group B = Transfer
Alternative 2.: No majority decision was found.: If there is no ma-
joritarian choice of a transfer in group a after phase 2, the members
of group A do not receive any payoﬀ.
The members of group B receive a random draw from the distribution
of [0,2.5] points as a payoﬀ.
End
After ﬁlling in a short questionnaire you will be displayed your total
earnings in Euro. You will be paid your total earnings privately and
in cash.
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